NENA
GIMENA SOLWAY, A.M. No.
P-07-2327
Complainant, [Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No.
04-1934-P]
Present:
- versus
- QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA, and
ARIEL
R. PASCASIO, Sheriff III, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
MTCC,
Branch 5,
MICHAEL
P. UCLARAY, Sheriff Promulgated:
III,
BENJAMIN
M. TULIO, Sheriff III,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
This
administrative matter pertains to a complaint[1]
dated 5 April 2004 filed by Nena Gimena Solway (complainant) against Ariel R.
Pascasio (Pascasio), Michael P. Uclaray (Uclaray) and Benjamin M. Tulio
(Tulio), charging them with Abuse of Authority and Harassment before the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA). Pascasio holds the position of Sheriff III,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
Branch 5,
The complaint, couched in Tagalog,
recites the antecedents, thus:
Ely Palenzuela (Palenzuela) is the
owner of a building in P13,200.00. Prior to the expiration of the lease contract
on 1 August 2003, the parties agreed on its renewal for five (5) years with a ten
percent (10%) increase in rentals or P15,000.00 monthly, but no formal
contract was executed because Palenzuela had left for Hawaii. Upon Palenzuela’s return, she increased the
monthly rental to P25,000.00 and shortened the period of lease to one
year. The parties failed to reach an
agreement. Hence, the matter was referred to the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa
(Lupon) of Barangay Barretto.
Before the Lupon, the parties signed
an Amicable Settlement[2]
dated 28 January 2004, wherein it was agreed that the monthly rental is P20,000.00;
that complainant will pay P240,000.00 as rental for one year after the finalization of
the contract, and; that the contract will be renewed yearly.
On
In
the morning of
In
her complaint, complainant questioned the presence of respondents in the
premises, considering that there was no court order to eject her.[6]
On
In
their Joint Comment/explanation,[8]
respondents admitted their presence in complainant’s establishment. According
to them, they were there to provide assistance in securing compliance with the Amicable
Settlement. Professing innocence of any act of harassment or abuse of
authority, they further claimed that they were instructed by Clerk of Court and
City Sheriff Alexander Rimando to observe the implementation of the arbitration
award. They were thus mere witnesses to complainant’s refusal to comply with
the settlement process which was under the control and supervision of the barangay
chairman. Respondents accordingly prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint.
On
In
the Resolution[11] dated
Respondents
are liable.
The Amicable Settlement reached by
the parties before the Barangay Lupon is susceptible to legal enforcement. However, the Local Government Code mandates that
it is the Lupon itself which is tasked to enforce by execution the amicable settlement
or arbitration award within six (6)
months from the date of settlement. Upon
the lapse of such time, the settlement may only be enforced by filing an action
before the appropriate court. Section
417 of the Local Government Code reads:
SEC.
417. Execution.–The amicable
settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the [L]upon
within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such
time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the proper city or municipal
court.
Clearly, the implementation of the
Notice of Execution was then outside the legitimate concern of the MTCC, of any
of its officers or of any other judicial officer. The barangay chairman’s letter to the MTCC seeking
assistance in the enforcement of the Amicable Settlement is not by any measure the court action contemplated
by law as it does not confer jurisdiction on the MTCC over the instant dispute.
Such could be accomplished only through the initiation of the appropriate
adversarial proceedings in court in accordance with Section 417 of the Local
Government Code. The OCA correctly
stated that there is no justiciable case filed before the MTCC that could have prompted
respondents to act accordingly.
Mere presence of a sheriff in a place
of execution where the court has no business is frowned upon. Such act elicits the appearance of
impropriety.[14] Participation or intervention in the process
is a more grievous act which exacts a more stringent sanction. And whether it
is unexplained presence or active participation, the act gives rise to the
impression that the execution of the Amicable Settlement is upon lawful order
of the court.
The situation at bar did not involve
any court order. The execution was
undertaken only under the authority of the barangay chairman, not even that of
the Lupon. Even if it was done under the
auspices of the Lupon, the presence of respondents would still not be
warranted. Both the barangay chairman and the Lupon are components of the local
government unit which, in turn, is subsumed under the executive branch of
government. As the intended execution of the settlement in this instance was inherently
executive in nature and, therefore, extrajudicial, it necessarily follows that judicial
officers cannot participate in the exercise.
The misdeeds of respondents unnecessarily put the integrity of the court
to which they are assigned and the dignity of the institution that is the
judiciary on the line.
The fact of willful participation is penalized
especially when the acts of the judicial officer concerned are not within his
or her legal authority. Complainant alleged that respondents actually
participated in the execution of the Amicable Settlement and the OCA observed
that these allegations were not sufficiently refuted by respondents.[15] More tellingly, the defense of respondents
that they were acting under the order of the Clerk of Court is belied by the
directive[16] issued
by the latter directing respondents to explain their presence at the site of the
implementation of the Notice of Execution.
Furthermore, the functions of sheriffs,
such as respondents, are enumerated under the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of
Court, as follows:
2.2.4.1 serves and/or executes writs and processes addressed and/or assigned to him by the Court and prepares and submits returns of his proceedings;
2.2.4.2 keeps
custody of attached properties or goods;
2.2.4.3 maintains
his own record books on writs of execution, writs of attachment, writs of
replevin, writs of injunction, and all other processes executed by him; and
2.2.4.4 performs such other duties as may be assigned by the Executive Judge, Presiding Judge and/or Branch Clerk of Court.
Nothing in this Rule justifies their
participation in the implementation of the Notice of Execution. Clearly, respondents were not acting within
their authority. This further lends credence to complainant’s claim that their
presence was only meant to instill fear on her to make her sign the Notice of
Execution.
Respondents have exceeded their mandated
duties when they interfered with functions that should have been exercised only
by barangay officials. Their actions run
counter to the Code of Conduct of Court Personnel which provides that court
personnel shall expeditiously enforce rules and implement orders of the court
within the limits of their authority. As
we have so reiterated in a previous ruling, a court employee is expected to do no more than what duty
demands and no less than what privilege permits. Though he may be of great help to specific individuals, but when that
help frustrates and betrays the public’s trust in the system, it cannot and
should not remain unchecked.[17]
Sheriffs play an important
role in the administration of justice since they are called upon to
serve court writs, execute all processes, and carry into effect the orders of
the court with due care and utmost diligence. As officers of the court,
sheriffs are duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the
performance of their duties, and conduct themselves with propriety and decorum
and act above suspicion.[18]
In the instant case, respondents
failed to uphold the standard of integrity and prudence ought to be exercised by
officers of the court. Based on the
foregoing, we are constrained to reverse the recommendation of the OCA in
dismissing the complaint.
We find that respondents’ unjustified
presence in the implementation of the Amicable Settlement despite the absence
of an order from the court in tandem
with its lack of jurisdiction over the matter constitutes misconduct. Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct
on the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice
prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the
cause. It generally means wrongful,
improper, unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.[19] Respondents’
impropriety subjected the image of the court to public suspicion and distrust.
Thus, they are guilty of simple misconduct.[20]
Under the Civil Service Rules,[21]
simple misconduct is punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day
to six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, respondents Ariel R.
Pascasio, Sheriff III, Branch 5, MTCC, Olongapo City, Michael P. Uclaray,
Sheriff III, MTCC-OCC, and Benjamin M. Tulio, Sheriff III, MTCC-OCC, Olongapo
City, are found GUILTY of misconduct and are hereby SUSPENDED for a period of three
(3) months without pay, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
[3]
In
the event that the settlement fails despite with the effort exerted by my
office the complainant and the respondent disagrees with the solution thereto
and the higher level of the government agency who has jurisdiction over that
matter recommend to issue a motion of execution to once and for all settle the
differences by issuing such notice of execution.
x
x x x
Its dispositive portion reads:
NOW,
THEREFORE, in behalf of the Lupong Tagapamayapa and by virtue of the powers vested
upon me and the Lupon by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law and Rules, I shall
cause to be realized from the goods and personal property
of NENA GIMENA & PATRICK SOLWAY the sum of Php. 240,000.00
agreed upon in the said amicable settlement (or adjudged in the said
arbitration award), unless voluntary compliance of said settlement or award
shall have been made upon receipt hereof.
4It does not appear from the record whether a
lease contract was finalized or formally executed.
[16]Rollo, p. 38. There is a visible discrepancy
between the signature of Clerk of Court Rimando in this directive and that
purporting to be his in the letter relied upon by respondents (see id. at 17).
[17]Donton v. Loria, A.M. No. P-03-1684,
[18]
[19]Lachica v. Tormis, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609,